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ARTICLE
INTEGRITY, DIGNITY AND THE ACT RESPECTING
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES :
CAN THE ACT PROVIDE
MORE APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION
FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT VICTIMS? 
by Laverne A. JACOBS*
La situation des victimes de harcèlement sexuel au travail est devenue une préoccupation de plus
en plus importante au cours des dernières années. La victime de harcèlement sexuel au travail qui reçoit
une indemnité de la Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CSST) pour une lésion qui résulte
du harcèlement, se trouve sans recours sous la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne pour ses
dommages moraux, matériels et exemplaires. Depuis l’arrêt Béliveau St-Jacques c. Fédération des
employées et employés de services publics inc. [1996] 2 R.C.S. 345, ce principe est fermement ancré dans
notre droit.
Pour rendre la situation encore plus compliquée, la Loi sur les accidents du travail et des
maladies professionnelles n’offre une indemnité que pour les atteintes à l’intégrité de la personne,
indemnité qui ne tient aucunement compte de l’atteinte au droit à la dignité que pose le harcèlement sexuel.
Dans cette étude, l’auteur explore la possibilité de réforme de la Loi afin de développer une indemnisation
plus appropriée pour les victimes de harcèlement sexuel au travail. Étant donné le contexte social et légal
d’où la Loi est née, cette exploration incorpore une revue de l’histoire et de l’évolution de la Loi ainsi
qu’un examen de quelques décisions récentes émanant du BRP et de la CALP. La place de la personne dans
le droit civil au Québec et la définition de deux droits de la personnalité (l’intégrité et la dignité) font aussi
partie intégrante de la présente étude.
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The plight of victims of workplace sexual harassment in Quebec has become a matter of great
concern in recent years. The worker who receives compensation through the Commission de la santé et de
la sécurité du travail (CSST) for an injury resulting from the sexual harassment finds herself with no
recourse to the Quebec Charter for moral, material or exemplary damages. This principle has become
entrenched in the law since the decision of Béliveau St-Jacques v. Fédération des employées et employés
de services publics inc. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345.
The matter is further complicated by the fact that the Act respecting industrial accidents and
occupational diseases compensates only for loss of integrity, providing a completely inappropriate
compensation for sexual harassment – an incident through which the person’s dignity is first and foremost
put under attack. In this paper, the author explores the possibility of reforming the Act in order to provide
a more appropriate compensation for victims of workplace sexual harassment, one that addresses the very
real affront to dignity that sexual harassment poses. As the Act is grounded in a particular social and legal
history, this exploration involves a review of its history and evolution as well as an examination of recent
decisions by the CSST’s reviewing bodies. Consideration of the place of the person in Quebec Civil Law
and the definition of certain personality rights (integrity and dignity) also form an integral part of this
paper.
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1. [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345, S.C.J. No. 70 (QL) [hereinafter Béliveau cited to S.C.R.].
2. R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 49 [hereinafter «Quebec Charter», «Charter»].
3. R.S.Q. c. A-3.001.
4. As well, a surge of legal writing quickly emerged on the scope and repercussions of this
decision. For example, see the special edition of Développements récents en responsabilité
civile dedicated to this judgment :   Service de formation permanente Barreau du Québec,
Développements récents en responsabilité civile (Cowansville, Que :  Yvon Blais, 1997);
see also  K. Lippel and D. Demers, Access to Justice for Sexual Harassment Victims :  The
Impact of Béliveau St-Jacques on Female Workers’ Rights to Damages (Ottawa :  Status of
Women Canada, 1998). 
I- Introduction
Although always a matter of great concern, sexual harassment at the
workplace has received a significant increase in attention since the decision of
Béliveau St-Jacques v. Féderation des employées et employés de services
publics inc1.  This Supreme Court decision holds that it is impossible for victims
of workplace sexual harassment to obtain moral, material or exemplary damages
under the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms2 if the victim has been
indemnified for an employment injury resulting from the same incident under
the Act respecting industrial accidents and occupational diseases3 (AIAOD).
The Court's judgment has raised concern over access to justice for sexual
harassment victims in Quebec, double compensation and the proper interplay
between the Quebec Charter and the AIAOD.  Most importantly, however, it
suggests a need for legislative reform. 
The debate on whether the Supreme Court's decision to deny these
damages is correct is a lively one4. My position is that the decision in Béliveau,
correct or not, has been made and that it is now a matter of exploring options to
provide more appropriate compensation for victims who claim under the
AIAOD.  This can be done by examining and re-conceptualizing the injury
indemnified by the Act.
The AIAOD compensates victims of sexual harassment at the workplace
for the injury the harassment has caused to their physical or psychological
integrity. Its use as a legal regime providing compensation for sexual harassment
claims in the workplace, however, poses serious problems. From a philosophical
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5. This is an implicit theme that comes across in the works of many philosophers and legal
theorists.  For example, Charles Taylor alludes to the need for proper recognition of one's
identity by law and politics in order to confirm one's dignity.  See «The Politics of
Recognition» in C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton :
Princeton University Press, 1992). 
6. It has been argued that this ideal form of the regime is being slowly worn away as workers
are now required to go through many of the burdens of proof found in civil liability suits in
order to receive compensation.  See M-C Prémont & M. Tancelin, «L'indemnisation des
victimes d'accident du travail :  une histoire de contre-courants» (1998) 39 C. de D. 233.
standpoint, one of the most alarming consequences of this use of the Act is that
it fosters a misrecognition of the very notion of sexual harassment in both fact
and law.  Keeping in mind that the law is both a product of and a statement to
society5, the social message sent by the AIAOD is that sexual harassment is not
to be tolerated in the workplace because of the injury it causes to the victim. 
This view of sexual harassment completely overlooks the most important reason
for indemnifying survivors of workplace sexual harassment —its affront to
human dignity.  I argue that sexual harassment is misplaced in a compensatory
regime based on the notion of integrity. If the AIAOD is to offer compensation
for this workplace occurrence, it should reflect the very real affront to dignity
that sexual harassment presents.  However, legislative reform of the AIAOD is
a delicate task.
The AIAOD finds its source in a special compensatory, no-fault regime
that is based on a particular social and legal history.  It represents a compromise
between workers and industrial employers that, in its ideal form, allows workers
to receive automatic compensation for injury without having to prove the fault
of the employer while at the same time relieving employers of costly damage
awards6. Any reform of the AIAOD should respect the regime's fundamental
objectives so that the regime does not become denatured.  It is therefore
important to understand what the Act's objectives are and how they have
evolved over time in order to establish whether the current Act is capable of
being modified to address the affront to human dignity that sexual harassment
poses. In addition, we need to ask whether we want this regime, whose initial
creation contemplated accidents to the physical person stemming from work
with industrial machinery, to be extended to workplace incidents that primarily
injure intangible, fundamental human rights and only consequentially affect
one's integrity.  It may well be that factors such as the bar to seeking reparation
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for moral damages that the AIAOD presents as well as the misrecognition of
sexual harassment that the regime perpetuates, justify the complete removal of
sexual harassment from the scheme of workplace accidents. Consideration of the
aims and objectives of the Act, in both its historical and current social context
is therefore a necessary part of any project of reform and will form an essential
part of my analysis.  
As the Act is based on the notion of integrity, I devote the first part of
this study to defining the notion of integrity in Quebec Civil law.  I discuss the
interpretation of integrity under the Quebec Charter and under the Civil Code
of Quebec in an attempt to demonstrate that integrity is an inappropriate base
notion for compensating victims of sexual harassment. I then move to a similar
definitional analysis of the notion of dignity, a personality right which is
integrally harmed during experiences of sexual harassment and which has a
marked absence from the AIAOD.
In the second part of the paper, I discuss practical problems to obtaining
compensation that can be alleviated by allowing interference with dignity to
form part of the criteria used to decide a claim for sexual harassment under the
Act. In the last part of this article, I present a brief social and legal history of the
AIAOD, focusing on why the Act was introduced and the compromise that
forms its foundation.  Through this analysis, I attempt to discern the extent to
which dignity and integrity were contemplated during the Act's evolution to see
if its current version can support the introduction of a dignity-based aspect in
order to offer more appropriate compensation for sexual harassment victims. I
question whether such a modification can be done while guarding intact the
essence of the compromise and values represented by the AIAOD. 
One final note that I wish to make is on the scope of this paper.
Although the Béliveau decision has made it clear that receipt of compensation
under the Act is a bar to recovery under the Charter, it has left unclear some of
the other circumstances in which a victim may be barred from suing under the
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7. See Beaudet et Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse v. Genest,
[1997] R.J.Q. 1488, J.T.D.P.Q. no. 12 (QL).  Discussed in more detail below, this is a
successor case to Béliveau in which the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal attempts to set out
the scenarios in which a workplace sexual harassment victim can sue under the Charter.
Currently pending appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, dossier # 705-53-000005-960
[hereinafter Genest cited to R.J.Q.] .
8. M. Drapeau, Le Harcèlement sexuel au travail :  le régime juridique de protection
(Cowansville, Que :  Yvon Blais, 1991) at 86-7 [translated by author].
Charter7.  There is thus  pending litigation on this issue.  This is an issue that I
will discuss only as it relates to the problem that this paper addresses.  The main
issue in this paper is not the right to sue but the fact that sexual harassment
victims who are indemnified under the AIAOD and thus barred from recovering
under the Charter, receive no compensation for the affront to dignity that the
sexual harassment has caused them. It starts from the premise that although
there may be other situations in which a sexual harassment victim is precluded
from suing under the Charter, it is clear that she cannot do so if she has received
compensation under the AIAOD.
II- Sexual Harassment
i) Sexual Harassment — definition and means of recourse
The term «sexual harassment» refers to any unwelcome behaviour that
is sexual in nature.  In his seminal text on sexual harassment in the workplace,
Maurice Drapeau offers the following definition of sexual harassment.  This
definition is a synthesis of the many legal definitions of sexual harassment
produced by doctrine as well as Canadian and American jurisprudence :
In general, sexual harassment in the workplace can be defined as all
unwelcome, sexually connotative behaviour, either verbal or physical,
which is generally repeated and which, by its nature, has a detrimental
effect on the victim's work environment, brings about adverse job-
related consequences or interferes with the physical or psychological
integrity of her person or with her dignity8.
Reference is made to both integrity and dignity in this definition.
Depending on the forum in which one institutes a claim for compensation, the
Integrity, Dignity and the Act respecting industrial accidents
286 and occupational diseases : Can the Act Provide (2000) 30 R.D.U.S.
More Appropriate Compensation for Sexual Harassment Victims?
9. Genest, supra note 7.
10. By virtue of section 49 of the Quebec Charter, supra note 2.
11. Among the numerous cases that refer to dignity in awarding for sexual harassment are :
Commission des droits de la personne du Québec v. Habachi (T.D.P.Q.) (1992), R.J.Q.
1439, Commission des droits de la personne du Québec v. Lemay, [1995] R.J.Q. 1967 and
Lippé et Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec v.
Québec (Procureur général), [1998] R.J.Q. 3397 [hereinafter Lippé].
focus of the decision-making body tends to be on one or the other of these
notions. 
In Quebec, a claim for sexual harassment can be made under the Charter.
Such a claim may be made by complaint to the Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse which may lead to a hearing before the
Quebec Human Rights Tribunal (QHRT) or by action in regular court.
However, if the after-effects of the sexual harassment incident has already been
compensated as an employment injury by the Commission de la santé et de la
sécurité du travail (CSST), section 438 of the AIAOD bars the claimant from
also seeking compensation under the Charter. This principle was firmly
established in Béliveau. The Supreme Court held that the AIAOD's statutory bar
against civil liability actions includes a bar against actions made under the
Charter. Beaudet et Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse v. Genest9 went further by attempting to define the different scenarios
in which a worker who is a victim of sexual harassment can make a claim under
the Charter. In this case, the QHRT found three such situations : i) where the
victim has not made a claim to the CSST ii) where the harassment victim has
made a claim but the CSST has not recognized that he/she has suffered an
employment injury and, iii) where the worker, not having received compensation
for the harassment from the CSST, is suing a co-worker. As Genest is pending
appeal, this analysis of the law is not a strong precedent.
When permitted, a claim under the Charter allows a person to seek
recourse for unlawful interference with a right guaranteed under the Charter as
well as cessation of the interference10. The QHRT usually conceives of sexual
harassment as a violation of dignity11, though the Tribunal has recognized that
Integrity, Dignity and the Act respecting industrial accidents
(2000) 30 R.D.U.S. and occupational diseases : Can the Act Provide 287
More Appropriate Compensation for Sexual Harassment Victims?
12. Sexual harassment in the workplace is also traditionally analyzed as an affront to the right
of equality in the workplace. (See C. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working
Women (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1979)) although it has been argued that the
courts and tribunals could be more pro-active in analyzing sexual harassment from this
perspective (see C. Sheppard, «Systemic Inequality and Workplace Culture : Challenging
the Institutionalization of Sexual Harassment» (1995) 3 C.L.E.L.J. 249). Dignity is possibly
the most immediate and crucial right violated through sexual harassment whether the sexual
harassment occurs at the workplace or elsewhere.  The effect on the right to equality is an
important and interesting aspect of the effect of sexual harassment but unfortunately is
beyond the scope of this paper.
13. Cases emanating from the QHRT that award damages for interference with the right to
integrity include Genova et Commission des droits de la personne du Québec v. Dhawan,
[1995] J.T.D.P.Q. no. 36 (QL) and Lippé, supra note 11.
14. AIAOD, supra note 3, s. 2. 
15. See AIAOD, ibid., s. 83, discussed in detail below; see also s. 1 which, in its first paragraph,
states  «[t]he object of this Act is to provide compensation for employment injuries and the
consequences they entail for beneficiaries».  
other rights, such as the rights to equality12 and integrity13, may be infringed as
well.
Alternatively, if permanent interference with one's integrity results from
sexual harassment at the workplace, compensation for the resulting injury can
be sought under the AIAOD.  Under the AIAOD, the injury arising from sexual
harassment is treated as any employment injury, that is, as an «injury or a
disease arising out of or in the course of an industrial accident, or an
occupational disease including a recurrence, relapse or aggravation»14.
Compensation is provided for the «permanent physical or mental impairment»
sustained by the worker who has suffered an employment injury15.  Although the
English version of the AIAOD is ambiguous in its use of the word
«impairment», the French text makes it clear that compensation will be awarded
for interference with the integrity of the person :
Le travailleur, victime d'une lésion professionelle qui subit une atteinte
permanente à son intégrité physique ou psychique a droit, pour chaque
accident du travail ou maladie professionnelle pour lequel il réclame
à la Commission, à une indemnité pour dommages corporels qui tient
compte du déficit anatomo-physiologique et du préjudice esthétique
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16. AIAOD, ibid., s. 83.
17. AIAOD, ibid., s. 88.
18. AIAOD, ibid., s. 88.  See also K. Lippel and D. Demers, Access to Justice for Sexual
Harassment Victims :  The Impact of Béliveau St-Jacques on Female Workers’ Rights to
Damages (Ottawa :  Status of Women Canada, 1998) supra note 4 at 19. 
19. The method used for finding these cases consisted of searching in the CALP database in
SOQUIJ.  This search produced less than 20 cases. Only the most relevant ones are discussed
in this paper. The CALP database includes all cases from 1986.  CSST cases (cases of first
instance) are inaccessible to the public and could not be considered. No decisions of the
newly established Commission des lésions professionnelles were considered.
The decision-making body for the AIAOD is the Commission de la santé et de la sécurité
du travail (CSST) (except where a special provision gives jurisdiction to another person or
agency (s. 349 AIAOD)). Prior to the coming into force of modifications to the Act on April
1, 1998, the first instance of review was done by the Bureau de révision paritaire (BRP).
The BRP examined the case de novo, its decision substituting that of the CSST. Further
review by the Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles (CALP) was also
available. (See generally, B. Cliche, M. Gravel, L. Ste-Marie, Les accidents du travail et les
maladies professionnelles : indemnisation et financement (Cowansville, Qué. : Yvon Blais,
1997), Titre V, Chapitre I, «Instances Décisionnelles»). Since April 1, 1998, however, the
CSST’s decision is first reviewed by members of the CSST (ss. 358.3 and 358.4 AIAOD)
and further review is provided by the Commission des lésions professionnelles (s. 359
AIAOD).
qui résultent de cette atteinte et des douleurs et de la perte de
jouissance de la vie qui résultent de ce déficit ou de ce préjudice.16
As a precondition to awarding compensation, the CSST requires that it
be presented with medical proof of the resulting bodily injury17.  Without
medical proof of the existence of sequelae, the Commission will not compensate
the victim18. Jurisprudential extension of the category of «employment injury»
in the past decade or so to include stress and stress-type injuries (e.g. depression)
has resulted in workers being compensated for injury caused to their integrity
due to sexual harassment. 
A review of the few existing reported decisions of the Bureau de
révision paritaire (BRP) and the Commission d’appel en matière de lésions
professionnelles (CALP) dealing with sexual harassment19 reveals that sexual
harassment is usually categorized as an industrial accident rather than as an
occupational disease.  The definition of industrial accident is broad.  It refers to
any sudden and unforeseen event that happens to a worker.  The event can be
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20. AIAOD, supra note 3, s. 2.  The broad definition of industrial accident contrasts with the
much narrower concept of occupational  disease which section 2 defines as «a disease
contracted out of or in the course of work and characteristic of that work or directly related
to the risks peculiar to that work». Only one case has characterized sexual harassment as an
industrial disease.  The analysis of how CALP reached this conclusion is not very rigorous.
CALP merely stated that it was of the opinion that the post-traumatic depression was in
relation to the work and was therefore an industrial accident.  It seemed to overlook that the
harassment incident was not characteristic of the employee’s work nor directly related to the
risks peculiar to that work.  See Desroches et Gestion Réaction Extra, C.A.L.P. 81815-60-
9608.    
21. Mme M., Commission des affaires sociales, division des accidents du travail, decision no.
JR000137323, November 23, 1983, bureau de Montréal. This led to recognizing that sexual
harassment as a «climat du travail» could cause employment injury. See Mme Nicole Leduc,
Bureau de révision de la Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec,
decision no. 2335, October 30, 1984, bureau de Longueuil. See also Drapeau, supra note
8 at 192-3 for a discussion of these cases.
22. See Gagnon et Commission administrative des régimes de retraite et d'assurance, [1989]
C.A.L.P. 769; P. et (Ville de)X, [1990] C.A.L.P. 677; Gravel et Canada (Ministère des
Anciens combattants), [1990] B.R.P. 249 and Blagoeva et Commission de contrôle de
l'énergie atomique, [1992] C.A.L.P. 898 which all hold harassment to be an industrial
accident by considering that the events taken together constitute a sudden and unforeseen
event. 
23. See Anglade et Montreal (Communauté urbaine de), [1985-86] B.R.P. 131.  Appealed
successfully (D.T.E. 88T-730), C.A.L.P. 00837-60-8609, 1988-06-17.
24. [1993] B.R.P. 199.  Other cases at the CSST level may have awarded compensation for
sexual harassment as an industrial accident at an earlier date.  Unfortunately, due to the
inaccessibility of cases decided by the CSST, it is difficult to know if the same reasoning was
attributable to any cause but must arise out of or in the course of his work and
must cause him an employment injury20. Nevertheless, despite this broad
definition, expansive legislative interpretation has been needed so that sexual
harassment, which usually takes place in the form of a series of events as
opposed to a single event, could be accepted as falling within these parameters.
The first important step was an acknowledgment that the term «employment
injury» can incorporate injuries of a psychological nature21. It was then accepted
that the superposition of several incidents of the same type, which, if considered
individually, would seem benign, could be said to present the sudden and
unforseen characteristics that constitute an industrial accident22.  It was by virtue
of this interpretation that compensation was awarded for racial harassment23. 
The first reported sexual harassment case in which this rule was applied is Leduc
et Alimentations Claude Dufour inc., a case in which a meat packager was
awarded compensation after being harassed by her manager24. 
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applied. These cases are unreported and access to the decisions is not open to the general
public. 
25. As opposed to public, Common law principles although it is important to note that, for the
purposes of judicial review, public law principles, finding their source in the Common law,
apply.
The fact that the entire worker’s compensation regime is built on the
premise that permanent detrimental effect to one's integrity must be shown
before compensation will be given means that sexual harassment victims face
particular barriers.  Before getting into a discussion of these barriers and in order
to fully understand why dignity is a more suitable notion than integrity on which
to ground sexual harassment claims, it is useful to outline and compare the two
rights as they exist in Quebec Civil law. 
ii) Defining the Notions of Integrity and Dignity in Quebec Civil Law
Integrity
The notion of integrity is not defined in the AIAOD.  Consequently, it
is to the droit commun that we must look for its definition25.  The AIAOD's
emergence from and links to Quebec private law suggest that the notion of
integrity it protects should find its source in the droit commun of Quebec Civil
law.  As indicated by the Preliminary Provision of the Civil Code of Quebec
(C.C.Q.) the droit commun forms the foundation of all other Quebec laws. On
the question of the extent to which the C.C.Q. can be used as the foundation of
other legislation, Jean-Maurice Brisson affirms : 
C'est une chose de dire qu’à cause de ses éléments intrinsèques, le
nouveau Code manifeste une aptitude à servir de fondement aux autres
lois; c'en est une autre que de savoir quelles sont précisément les
autres lois que l'on pourra faire reposer sur le Code.  Or cette dernière
question est probablement celle qui est la plus fondamentale pour
l'avenir du Code à titre d'expression du droit commun.
À cette question on peut apporter, me semble-t-il, deux réponses :  la
première, que le Code civil du Québec doit être considéré comme le
fondement de toutes les autres lois, dans la mesure où celles-ci font
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26. J-M. Brisson, «Le Code civil, droit commun?» in Le nouveau code civil :interprétation et
application :  Journées Maximilien-Caron 1992 (Montreal :  Thémis, 1993) 292 at 312
[emphasis added].
27. Compensation for victims under worker's compensation legislation generally comes from a
collective fund comprised of employer contributions.  In the case of the AIAOD, the
Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail (CSST), an administrative body
established by the Act respecting occupational health and safety, R.S.Q. c. S-2.1, ss. 137ff,
is responsible for collecting the funds required for the administration of the AIAOD.  A
valuation is made at the end of each year and the sums collected by the CSST are deposited
into a bank or a savings and credit union (AIAOD, ss. 285, 287).  See generally Chapter IX
(ss. 281-331.3) on Financing and Chapter X (ss. 332-348) on the special provisions
applicable to employers held personally responsible for the payment of benefits.
appel, principalement ou accessoirement, à des notions de droit privé;
la deuxième, que le Code civil s'applique à l'État, lorsqu'une règle de
droit public en a décidé ainsi.
– Pourquoi doit-on dire que le Code civil est le fondement de toutes
les autres lois? Pour la raison très simple qu’il est devenu difficile de
dire à quelle catégorie juridique traditionnelle les lois contemporaines
peuvent être rattachées. Rares sont les lois aujourd’hui, s’il en existe
encore, qui peuvent être qualifiées exclusivement de lois de droit
privé. Mais rares sont les lois, aussi, qui ne font aucunement appel, ne
serait-ce que de façon marginale, à des notions de droit privé.26  
Although the AIAOD derogates from the civilian principle of fault-based
responsibility, it does not derogate from civilian private law principles
altogether. The primary aim remains compensation for the injured party –
compensation which is still paid by the presumed author of the injury (the
employer) albeit through a collective fund instead of directly27.  In defining the
notions of integrity and dignity it should therefore be a valid approach to look
to the droit commun. 
The C.C.Q.'s Preliminary Provision defines the droit commun as the
C.C.Q.'s body of rules working in harmony with the Quebec Charter. Of these
two sources, the Charter value is most significant.  This is because section 52 of
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28. This strong requirement is further supported by section 53 of the Quebec Charter which
directs that any doubt in the interpretation of a law must be resolved in keeping with the
intent of the Charter.  Wide interpretation has been given to this direction, the Courts have
gone as far as holding that inspiration is to be found in the general philosophy of the Charter
when interpreting a law.  See Thibault v. Corporation professionelle des médecins du
Québec, [1992] R.J.Q. (C.A.) 2029 at 2038-39.
29. See for example A. Mayrand, L'Inviolabilité de la personne humaine, (Montreal :  Wilson
& LaFleur, 1975).
30. [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211 at 251 [hereinafter St-Ferdinand]. 
31. The only decision prior to St-Ferdinand which attempts to define the concept is Viau v.
Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique, [1991] R.R.A. 740.
the Charter requires that every law conform to its first thirty-eight sections in the
absence of express derogation28.  The AIAOD contains no such derogation.  
Looking, then, to the droit commun, we see that the extra-patrimonial
right to integrity is found both in the Civil Code of Quebec and in the Charter
of Human Rights and Freedoms.   As one of the first rights identified in the
Code, it appears to occupy a position of primary importance in Quebec Civil
law. It is therefore a bit surprising that the right is not explicitly defined in either
enactment and that most related jurisprudence and doctrine focus not on what
the right to integrity is, but rather, on reasons why the right exists and how it can
be infringed29. As Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé observes in Québec
(Curateur Public) v. Syndicat national des employés de l'hôpital St-Ferdinand,
Quebec courts have paid little attention to interpreting the concept of integrité30.
Indeed, the decision in St-Ferdinand provides the most thorough and current
definition of the right to integrity31.
In St-Ferdinand, the unionized employees of a hospital centre for the
mentally disabled held a thirty-three day strike in order to pressure their
employer into discarding plans for staff re-organization. As a result of the strike,
over seven hundred patients were deprived of certain care and services that they
normally received.  In its reasons for judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada
closely examines both the notions of integrity and dignity and concludes that the
temporary discomfort suffered by the patients constituted an interference with
their right to dignity but not with their droit à l'intégrité. The Court holds that
le droit à l'ntégrité as found in section 1 of the Charter, is a guarantee against
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32. St-Ferdinand, supra  note 30 at 252-53. This is also the minimum requirement for exemplary
damages to be awarded for violation of the right under section 49.
33. Preliminary Disposition, C.C.Q. See generally on the relationship between the Code and the
Charter, A-F Bisson, «Nouveau code civil et jalons pour l'interprétation :  traditions et
transitions» (1992) 23 R.D.U.S. 1.
34. Art. 11 C.C.Q.
35. Ibid.
36. Art. 22 C.C.Q.
37. Art. 19 C.C.Q.
38. Art. 19, para. 2 C.C.Q.
39. [1988] R.J.Q. 2424 (C.A.).
any interference that leaves a person less complete.  This diminished state must
be of a more than fleeting nature, evidenced by marks or sequelae, in order for
it to be said that the person's integrity has been violated32. Insofar as St-
Ferdinand maintains that the right to integrity is the right of a person to remain
intact, it is difficult not to agree with the Court's definition. This interpretation
of the right to integrity also finds support in the Civil Code of Quebec (with
which the Charter works in harmony to provide the droit commun33) and its
related jurisprudence. 
There are several instances in the C.C.Q. which indicate that the right
to integrity of the person is one which aims to keep the person intact. The
chapter on integrity of the person, for example, suggests a desire on the part of
the legislature to guard the human being in a state of being whole.  Interference
in the form of care such as specimen-taking34 and removal of tissue35 require the
consent of the person if possible and, if not, that of a substitute. Similarly,
consent is required in order to donate body parts removed during medical care
to research36 and for the alienation of a body part inter vivos 37.  Finally, those
incapable of giving consent can only alienate a body part «that is capable of
regeneration»38, which also indicates concern with guarding the human being
intact.
Numerous cases in Quebec Civil law jurisprudence award damages for
loss of physical integrity — a fact which further suggests that the law
acknowledges an interference with one's right to integrity to have occurred when
a person is rendered less whole. These include cases well-known to every
student of Quebec Civil law such as Gburek v. Cohen39, in which a patient was
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40. [1986] R.J.Q. 1610 (C.A.).
41. [1980] C.A. 596.
42. See for example Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa Inc., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 regarding
infringement of the right to privacy and Deschamps v. Renault (1972) (1977), C. de D. 937
(S.C.) awarding an injunction to prevent unauthorized use of another's image. 
43. In this regard, it is important to note that while dignity may have some common attributes
with the rights often placed under the rubric of moral integrity (e.g. honour and reputation),
dignity is an autonomous right; not a subset of integrity. The distinction between integrity
and dignity is discussed in greater detail below. See also É. Deleury & D. Goubau, Le droit
des personnes physiques, 2nd ed. (Cowansville, Que. :  Yvon Blais, 1997) c. III at 153ff.
rendered deaf after being treated for too long on an antiobiotic known to cause
deafness; Jim Russell International Racing Drivers School(Canada) v. Hite40 ,
dealing with disfigurement; and Trans Quebec Helicopters v. Estate of David
Lee 41, awarding compensation for decapitation.
In addition to interference with physical integrity (one's physical person),
damages awarded for loss of or interference with moral integrity also abound in
Quebec Civil law42. Generally speaking, moral integrity comprises the subjective
qualities that serve to define a person as an individual such as one’s thoughts
and sentiments. The Courts tend to place interference with all personality rights
of a non-physical nature together under this title (including the rights to honour,
reputation, privacy and dignity). Unfortunately, this is usually done with no
acknowledgment of the tension that exists between the extent to which the rights
overlap and the inherent distinctiveness of each43. Finally, in conceiving of the
notion of integrity as a right, I would add that the act of rendering the person less
whole must be done without or in spite of the person's consent in order to
constitute a violation.
At the same time, the Supreme Court's definition of integrity is a bit
problematic.  Its difficulty arises from the fact that it does not distinguish
between the right to integrity and the right to inviolability. We must keep in
mind that the Supreme Court of Canada is defining le droit à l'intégrité as it is
found in section 1 of the Charter.  Because of confusing drafting, the resulting
definition of le droit à l'intégrité is said to correspond to the «right to
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44. The wording of articles 3 and 10 of the C.C.Q. infers that integrity is very similar to the
notion of inviolability but distinct from it.  The Code explicitly provides a right to
inviolability and one to integrity of the person, indicating that the two rights are not the
same. That article 3 offers two separate rights is most clearly gleaned from reading the
French version of the text :  «Toute personne est titulaire de droits de la personnalité, tels le
droit à la vie, à l'inviolabilité et à l'intégrité de sa personne…». The use of the preposition
«à» before each of the rights of inviolability and integrity, indicates that they are distinct
rights.  Similarly, the wording of art. 10 («Every person is inviolable and entitled to the
integrity of his person. Except in cases provided for by law, no one may interfere with his
person without his free and enlightened consent»)  suggests that :  a) inviolability and
integrity are distinct and independent rights and b) interfering with a person’s inviolability
is a first step toward interfering with her integrity.  Inviolability thus appears to shield
integrity.  In any case, inviolability and integrity are not seen as one and the same in either
article 3 or 10. 
45. See preceding note.  The school of thought maintaining that each right has its own
discernable finality has strongly emerged since the coming into force of the Charter.  See F.
Allard, «La vie privée : cet obscur objet de la prestation contractuelle» in Mélanges Paul-
André Crépeau, (Cowansville, Que. :  Yvon Blais, 1997)1;  F.Allard, «Une délimitation de
l'ordre public par  une nouvelle représentation du sacré :  la dignité de l'humain» (1998) not
yet published; H.P. Glenn, «Le droit au respect de la vie privée» (1979) 39 R. du B. 879;
P.A. Molinari & P. Trudel, «Le droit au respect de l'honneur de la réputation et de la vie
privée :  aspects généraux et application» in Formation permanente du Barreau du Québec,
Application des Chartes des droits et libertés en matière civile (Cowansville, Que. :  Yvon
Blais, 1988) 197. 
inviolability»44. (The English text of article 1 offers a right to «inviolability» as
the equivalent of the «droit à…l'intégrité»).  St-Ferdinand therefore sets out the
right to integrity (intégrité) and then concludes that this right is the same as the
right to inviolability.  It does not contemplate the definition of the right to
inviolability, a right which is conceptually different and, like all extra-
patrimonial rights, has its own finality45. 
More specifically, it is unclear how to classify a situation in which all
of the elements of a violation of the right to integrity are present except for
evidence of the person’s diminution. Consider a situation in which a person is
slapped in the face, no mark or bruising is left on the person's cheek and a
psychological assessment reveals that the person has suffered no trauma by the
incident.  In such a situation, there are therefore no after-effects of either a
physical or psychological nature. Based on the St-Ferdinand test, the slap would
not be considered an interference with the person's physical or moral integrity
because the person has in no way been rendered less intact. Yet, there is
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46. St-Ferdinand, supra, note 30 at 256.
something about this conclusion that is annoying to the sensibilities. The slap
clearly constitutes an interference with one's physical person; it is also a
violation since no consent was given by the person slapped. I suggest that this
is the notion of inviolability, an intermediate right between the right to integrity
and the right to dignity. Mere non-consensual interference with another in either
a physical or emotional manner could be what defines a violation of the right of
inviolability. Unfortunately, there is no doctrine or case law on this topic. It is
therefore possible to violate one's right to inviolability without harming one's
right to integrity.  On the other hand, violating one's right to integrity without
violating one's right of inviolability does not seem possible.
In summary, a violation of the right to integrity is an interference with
one's physical (tangible) or moral (intangible) state of being intact.  St-
Ferdinand has held that this interference must result in the person being
perceivably less whole. I remain skeptical as to whether the right to integrity
should be read to designate a right to inviolability in all circumstances. The right
to integrity distinguishes itself from the right to inviolability in that the right to
inviolability is the right to not have interference with one's person.  While the
right to integrity is violated when one becomes less intact, a person's right to
inviolability has a lower threshold of violation. 
Dignity
Again, it is St-Ferdinand that provides the current state of the law.
Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé's analysis presents a just appreciation of the
right to dignity.   Based on an examination of the ordinary meaning of the word
and of cases dealing with dignity in both Quebec and Canadian Charter
jurisprudence, she concludes that :
s. 4 of the Charter addresses interferences with the fundamental
attributes of a human being which violate the respect to which every
person is entitled simply because he or she is a human being and the
respect that a person owes to himself or herself.46
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47. St-Ferdinand, supra note 30 at 254.  
48. One wonders if an objective appreciation would also be used in a situation where the person
is able to appreciate his own worth as an individual but refuses to do so. 
This definition sets forth some very important general principles.  First,
it implies that the first step to deciding if the right to dignity has been violated
is to determine whether there has been interference with a fundamental attribute
of the person.  The meaning of a fundamental attribute of the person is not
explicit in the decision.  With respect to the specific case of mentally disabled
persons, Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé appears to interpret the need for care
as a fundamental attribute, although she does not say so expressly.   Because this
need for care was disregarded, the respect to which the patient was entitled as
a human being was not accorded.  As dignity is the violation of respect owed to
each person merely because he is a human being, Madam Justice L'Heureux-
Dubé was able to draw the conclusion that the dignity of the patients had been
violated. The holding in St-Ferdinand suggests that fundamental attributes can
be appreciated in light of the particular person situated in a specific context (e.g.
a mentally disabled person).  In this way, fundamental attributes can be
interpreted to include not only the more universal characteristics of human
beings such as life but also those that are specific to a particular group.  It may
even extend to specific characteristics of an individual. 
A further general principle advanced in St-Ferdinand is that dignity
incorporates both an internal and an external component. The internal
component relates to the respect merited by a human being from others simply
because the person is a human being,  while the external component denotes
one's self-respect including his sense of pride and honour47. St-Ferdinand
suggests that both components are normally to be considered and that in cases
where the person is unable to appreciate his worth as an individual, the internal
component must be given precedence. In St-Ferdinand, this meant that the fact
that the patients may not have been able to appreciate that their dignity had been
violated was of no consequence in determining that the violation had occurred48.
The wording of the Charter and doctrinal writings mirror the principles
enounced in St-Ferdinand.  The preamble of the Charter indicates that respect
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49. Allard, «Délimitation», supra note 45 at 21-22.
for human dignity is the underlying principle that informs all of the Charter
rights.  It reads :
…Whereas all human beings are equal in worth and dignity,
and are entitled to equal protection of the law;
Whereas respect for the dignity of the human being and
recognition of his rights and freedoms constitute the foundation of
justice and peace;..
This reflects Madam Justice L'Heureux-Dubé's assertion that the respect
that every person is owed because he is a human being must be accorded.
Similarly, France Allard, speaking of dignity as it is found in Quebec Civil law,
states :
Le droit québécois aborde la dignité humaine de deux manières fort
différentes.  La première, celle que l'on rencontre le plus souvent dans
la jurisprudence, est celle de la dignité humaine telle qu'elle est
protégée par l'article 4 de la Charte des droits et libertés de la
personne. Dans l'optique de l'article 4, la dignité humaine se rapproche
du sentiment d'honneur, elle protège la personne, à titre de droit,
contre un sentiment de déshonneur, d'angoisse et de honte, de
dégradation ou d'asservissement.  La seconde, qui se rattache à la
limite d'ordre public, relève d'un autre ordre, celui-là transcendant, qui
n'appartient à personne en particulier, mais à tous. C'est la dignité au
sens des préambules de différentes déclarations internationales et de
la Charte des droits et libertés de la personne. Cette notion de dignité
vise la protection de l’idée abstraite de l’humain que chacun
représente. Elle cherche en quelque sorte à assurer la survivance de
l’humanité en protégeant chacun contre le sentiment de dégradation,
d’infériorisation, d’avilissement ou d’exploitation que chacun peut
vivre par la négation de l’autre, représentation de soi.49
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iii) Sexual Harassment properly conceived as an affront to dignity as
opposed to integrity
Once the rights of integrity and dignity are outlined, it becomes clearer
why, of the two, interference with dignity is a more appropriate basis for sexual
harassment claims. Whereas a violation of the right to integrity involves the
person's state of wholeness being attacked and dismantled in some piecemeal
fashion, a violation of the right to dignity involves an attack on the person’s
fundamental core.  
Put another way, a loss of integrity can be seen as the chipping away of
the person — the loss or harm to a physical body part in the case of physical
integrity or the loss or harm done to one of a person's intangible qualities, such
as one's reputation, in the case of moral integrity. The injury to one's dignity is
to the person's fundamental core or essence as a human being. The chipping
away of the person's body represented by the classic, industrial revolution type
scenario where a worker's appendage is physically mutilated by a machine or the
more modern-day scenario where the constant daily stress of repetitive work
causes a nervous breakdown, has little similarity with the incident of sexual
harassment. In the former cases, harm is first and foremost done to the person's
integrity — it is some aspect of her wholeness such as her physical person or her
mental state that is attacked or interfered with.  In the latter case of sexual
harassment, the person is primarily attacked at her core through mere, if not
blatant, disrespect for her as a human being.
Under the AIAOD, sexual harassment is treated as any other workplace
industrial accident but it is very unlike other workplace industrial accidents.
There may be physical or psychological after-effects of sexual harassment that
affect the victim’s integrity but even if such after-effects exist, they will always
be secondary to the harm done to the victim’s dignity. It is in this light that Chief
Justice Dickson's definition of sexual harassment in Janzen v. Platy emerges as
a just and apt appreciation of the problem.  He asserts :
Sexual harassment is a demeaning practice, one that constitutes a
profound affront to the dignity of the employees forced to endure it.
By requiring an employee to contend with unwelcome sexual actions
or explicit sexual demands, sexual harassment in the workplace attacks
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50. Janzen v. Platy,  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252 at 1284.
the dignity and self-respect of the victim both as an employee and as
a human being.50
III- Modifying the AIAOD
i) Practical Problems, Proposed Reform
On a practical level, problems exist which act as barriers to
compensation for sexual harassment victims. These problems relate to the use
of loss of integrity as the sole determining factor of compensation, coupled with
the burdens and methods of proof used by the tribunals in deciding whether to
compensate. They could be alleviated if the detrimental effects to the claimant's
dignity were considered as well. Allowing compensation for the affront to
dignity avoids the Béliveau problem :  the worker for whom the after-effects of
sexual harassment is deemed an employment injury, who receives compensation
under the AIAOD and who is thus precluded from suing under the Charter will
be able to recover some compensation for the injury to the right to dignity which
the harassment has caused her.  In holding that the bar to claims in civil liability
presented by section 438 of the Act encompasses claims under the Charter, the
majority in Béliveau may have overlooked that the partial, lump sum payment
offered by the AIAOD is not aimed to account for interferences with dignity and
that sexual harassment is a unique type of industrial accident in which it is the
worker’s dignity that is first and foremost affected.  If the victim who is
compensated by the AIAOD cannot claim for damages under the Charter, she
will be precluded from any compensation for the affront to dignity she has
suffered. Compensating for dignity therefore also renders the award more true.
The damage award will reflect the affront to the person's dignity, the primary
harm done in an incident of sexual harassment as opposed to just impairment,
the secondary harm done.
It is currently a difficult and arduous process to prove loss to one's
integrity after sexual harassment. As the case law stands, only claimants with the
clearest of claims can successfully obtain compensation under the AIAOD.
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51. Desroches et Gestion Réaction Extra, C.A.L.P. 81815-60-9608; Corporation Urgence-Santé
et Yasvinski, C.A.L.P. 65354-60-9501.
52. Supermarché Ste-Julie inc. et Lebouthillier et CSST, C.A.L.P. 67355-62-9503, 72694-62-
9508.
53. Ibid.  
54. C.A.L.P. 46004-60-9210.
These claimants, usually women, generally have nothing else occurring in their
lives that could have caused the stress51 or they have very minor troubles in their
distant past such as an isolated incident of being molested as a child52.  If the
stress or stress-related injury can be traced to a cause other than the workplace
sexual harassment, the worker will not be compensated.  The worker is thus
required to undergo extensive examinations.  In Supermarché Ste-Julie inc. et
Lebouthillier et CSST53, for example, Ms. Lebouthillier was examined by a total
of four doctors for compensation of a 5% anatomophysiological loss in the form
of a minor neurosis.  The first doctor was the one she chose.  He referred her to
a psychiatrist.  After that, both the employer and the CSST requested that she
see a psychiatrist of its respective choice.  
Not only are these examinations potentially numerous they are also
extremely intrusive.  Every aspect of the woman's life is examined by the
doctors —her family life, her upbringing and even her cultural adaptation. This
information is then examined again by the Commission, often at a hearing, in its
determination of whether the injury was a result of the harassment and of the
appropriate award to be given.  The CALP decision of Phuong Dung et Granby
inc.54 presents an example of how intrusive these examinations can be. In the
written judgment, the reported facts include an excerpt from the notes of Ms.
Phuong Dung's psychiatrist.  In examining the other events occurring in Ms.
Phuong Dung's life which may have caused her stress in addition to or instead
of the alleged sexual harassment at work, the tribunal accepts the psychiatrist's
evidence of conjugal problems and of difficulties in adapting culturally. The
psychiatrist had noted :
…Elle [Ms. Phuong Dung] a des fortes aspirations universitaires
tandis que le mari est un ouvrier.  Il semblerait que selon sa culture,
elle devrait renoncer à cet avancement, cette émancipation.
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…En effet, Asiatique et Vietnamienne de naissance elle a grandi, s'est
développée à un moment où ce pays d'Asie était balayé par la pensée
occidentale et bouleversé par la guerre.  Elle semble vouloir plutôt
s'identifier à la femme blanche, occidentale, progressiste qu'à la
personne dont ethniquement elle est apparentée55.
One's cultural adaptation need not enter the analysis to compensate for
sexual harassment.  Indeed, it is a bit disturbing that a tribunal should be allowed
to make its decision to compensate based in part on something as subjective as
a worker's perceived cultural adaptation. If dignity were used as a deciding
factor this process could be made less intrusive for the worker. An affront to
dignity can essentially be decided on the facts of the case.  Once it has been
determined that the incident constitutes sexual harassment and that the worker
was the victim, it is undeniable that her dignity has been harmed. This dignity
is her internal dignity, the respect she is owed because she is a human being. No
concern for the pre-existing condition of the person would enter the analysis
because irrespective of the person's condition before the incident, so long as she
is human she has dignity that must be respected. 
The way in which dignity should be introduced as a practical matter is
a more difficult question.  As one option, section 83 of the Act could be
modified to offer the worker, in addition to what it already provides, a fixed but
indexed amount in cases of sexual harassment.  This lump sum would serve to
represent the harmful effects to dignity that the worker has experienced.  Since
it is the internal dignity with which we are concerned, that is, the dignity that
every person is owed merely because she is a human being, a fixed lump sum
for all sexual harassment victims would be acceptable.  This lump sum would
not compensate the worker for the full amount of the damage suffered to her
dignity; however, compensating for less than the full amount of the injury
suffered fully accords with the philosophy of the worker's compensation regime.
In the spirit of compromise, the regime aims to provide a type of insurance, it
is not meant to compensate the worker in full. 
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Under this proposed modification, the additional lump sum would be
awarded in sexual harassment cases that are successful under section 83 as it
currently exists. In cases where the claimant fails to show loss of or interference
with integrity under section 83 but where it is clear that sexual harassment has
taken place, dignity could also be used as a basis for awarding the lump sum or
other types of compensation like time away from work. Though this solution
may not serve to prevent the examinations from being numerous or overly
intrusive, it would ensure that workplace sexual harassment victims are not
precluded from all compensation due to other events happening in their lives. A
further positive aspect of this modification is that it does not greatly modify the
purpose of the Act. The Act still serves to compensate injury caused by
workplace incidents but at the same time reconceives the notion of injury so that
it encompasses the affront to dignity that exists in incidents of workplace sexual
harassment.
A disadvantage of the proposed modification is that it may entail giving
the worker a monetary sum while she remains at a workplace where no
obligation has been imposed on the harasser or employer to end the sexual
harassment problem. This raises difficult moral and philosophical issues and
makes us wonder if the CSST should be dealing with sexual harassment claims
at all. If it becomes common for workers to receive compensation for sexual
harassment without any obligation on the part of the harasser or employer to
solve the problem, the message sent to society is that sexual harassment in the
workplace is acceptable so long as money is paid to the victim. The situation
may encourage the normalization of the incidence of sexual harassment at the
workplace.  The QHRC’s mandate, by contrast,  involves introducing measures
in the workplace to ensure that the interference with the right is stopped. I note
that while the Supreme Court in Béliveau dealt with compensatory and
exemplary damages, it did not address the right to have the violation stopped
which is also granted under section 49 of the Charter.  Possibly, this means that
a request to have the harassment stopped could still be brought to the QHRC and
that the threat of normalization is not a strong one.  
A significant advantage to claiming through the CSST is that the worker
can receive time away from work.  For the worker, this may mean time away
from her harasser.  As well, the monetary compensation she will receive while
off work will come much more quickly than a judgment award through the
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QHRT or the regular courts. Moreover, many victims do not wish to deal with
the stigma and difficulties that are often associated with suing an employer or
co-worker for sexual harassment.  Women who sue can attract the reputation of
a troublesome employee and experience difficulty finding future employment
because of this reputation.  Sexual harassment can also be difficult to prove.
Factors such as these could be very important to the claimant and should be
respected.  In fact, so long as the claimant is told of the advantages and
disadvantages of claiming through each of these systems and makes an informed
choice, this choice should be respected.  The CSST should therefore be obliged
to advise all workplace sexual harassment victims of their option to seek action
through the QHRC or the courts (whether or not the worker has suffered
impairment).  It should also be required to inform them of the fact that obtaining
compensation through the worker's compensation regime means renouncing the
option of suing the employer later for full compensation for the injury caused to
their extrapatrimonial rights.  To help ensure that an obligation will be imposed
on the employer or harasser to stop the harassment, the CSST and QHRC could
perhaps work in collaboration.  Overall, the advantages outweigh the
disadvantages.  From a practical and philosophical viewpoint, it is worth
offering compensation for dignity through the AIAOD. 
The next question we need to address is whether the Act can support this
proposed modification.  An examination of the ways in which the objectives and
attributes of the Act have grown since its creation in 1909, indicates that the Act
is capable of supporting this change.  At the same time, in light of the recent
movement towards becoming a social security Act (that is, one that only
indemnifies for injury only to the extent that it allows the worker to maintain
lost revenue), importing compensation for loss of or interference with dignity
will present a change in orientation to the Act’s evolution – a change in
orientation which nevertheless provides a link to the Act’s traditional roots.
ii) History and Evolution of the Worker's Compensation Regime in
Quebec — the Act's capacity to support the modifications proposed
As it currently stands, the AIAOD does not provide compensation for the
harm to dignity suffered by sexual harassment victims in the workplace. One
way to determine whether the Act can support a modification through which the
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dignity of the victim can be considered is to examine the major changes made
to the objectives and defining aspects of the Act since its inception to see if
similar or analogous modifications to the one proposed have been made. In this
section, I first set out the circumstances leading to the Act's creation in 1909.
I then examine the evolution of the Act's aims and objectives in three phases56.
The three phases centre around the years when the most major modifications
were made to the Act — 1909, 1931 and 1985. I conclude that, except for the
period from 1985 to present, the changes made in each phase reflect a definite
movement toward considering the employee as a human being instead of merely
a worker. This trend seems to be an indication that considering the dignity of the
employee is not completely outside of the Act's realm.  The 1985 modifications
show a step backward.  The minimal amounts awarded and the length of time
for which they are awarded, make the employee seem less valued as a human
being than as a tool of production. 
The First Act Respecting Workplace Accidents in 1909 and the
Situation Prior to it
Much work has been done on the legal recourses available to workers
prior to the first Act respecting workplace accidents in Quebec57.  These texts
focus on the problems caused by the doctrine of civil responsibility for both the
workers and the employers.  In our case, it may be beneficial to shift the focus :
instead of concentrating on the shortcomings of the civil law system, let us
attempt to examine how the worker was perceived at that time.  Why was he
protected?  Was his protection seen merely as a means of keeping the industry
running?  To what degree did the Act aim to protect his human rights generally,
and his rights to dignity and integrity specifically?  We must ask these questions,
however, while still remaining within the context of the compromise that was
established. In other words, while focusing on the worker, we must not lose sight
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of the fact that the regime was established to benefit both the employee and the
employer.
Prior to the first Workmen's Compensation Act, workers who were
injured at the workplace could only sue their employer using the general system
of civil liability.  This caused them significant hindrances. These obstacles
stemmed from the fact that it was necessary to prove the employer's fault in
order to succeed, whereas, in the majority of cases, the immediate cause of the
accident was impossible to determine58.  If the accident could indeed be proven,
another difficulty arose in convincing co-workers to testify as witnesses against
the employer.  Co-workers were often understandably hesitant to speak out
against the employer.  Many times, the accidents suffered by workers were
devastating and forced them to leave the workforce.  As the worker was usually
the husband and supporter of the family, if the legal suit was unsuccessful, his
family was left to suffer59. 
These suits in civil responsibility also had potentially disastrous effects
on the  employer.  The slightest degree of fault led to a finding of liability by the
courts.  Employers were found to be at fault for not providing the proper
safeguards to prevent the accident60, such safeguards included the safest
equipment no matter how expensive or unusual61.  They were also held
responsible for not doing all within their power to protect the worker against the
accident, including safeguarding him against his own carelessness62 and the
carelessness of his co-workers63.  As a consequence, employers found
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themselves faced with excessive damage awards as well as innumerable court
costs64. 
In 1907, the Globensky Commission, comprised of a group of three
commissioners, was appointed by the Quebec government.  The Commission's
mandate was to canvass the opinions of employers and employees in Quebec,
to study the laws and jurisprudence of other countries concerning workplace
accidents, and ultimately, to make recommendations to the Quebec Government
as to a more equitable system for indemnifying workplace accidents.  The
Commissioners' report formed a fundamental source of the workmen's
compensation law eventually adopted. In reaching the conclusion that a law
should be enacted that would entitle accident victims to compensation at the
expense of the employer, the Commissioners contemplated not only the
economic aspects of the problem but the humanitarian ones as well.  In the
report, they assert that «[h]uman life is so valuable that it cannot be placed on
the scales with a question of costs, however considerable these may be, when the
question is to prevent an accident»65.   Expanding on this theme, they note the
humanitarian, Christian and social  principles that incited the worker's
compensation laws in Germany and England : 
Outside of the economical point of view, such a law could be justified
by the humanitarian principles which have induced Germany and
England to adopt compensation measures.  It would also find its
justification in the application of the principle that it behooves the
State to insure the welfare of the working classes by protecting them
against accidents and by granting them some resources when they are
victims of those accidents.66
In Germany, it was believed that the state had a duty toward its poorer
classes.  This duty was imposed by humanitarian and Christian principles and
also by a policy by which, the government felt, it was necessary to impress upon
the greater masses that the state was a beneficent one.
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Similarly, British politicians had declared England's worker's
compensation law to be «founded on a great human principle and on public
interest»67. The English law aimed to «save from ruin and misery thousands of
workmen when victims of accidents» and was based on the dual principles that
a worker had a right to reasonable compensation when injured in the
performance of his duties and that such compensation was a charge on industry,
similar to the repair of a piece of machinery68.
This discussion about founding the new law partly on humanitarian
principles seems to indicate that there was a genuine concern for the employee's
fundamental rights to life, dignity and integrity in addition to his economic and
social rights to work and to have his family supported when he was injured and
therefore unable to work. Yet, at the same time, this humanitarian desire
presents a paradox.  It is not clear if the worker is being saved out of respect for
the dignity that every human being is entitled or because he is viewed as a
means of keeping the industry running — a machine.  This paradoxical
metaphor of humanitarian desire to save the man as a machine is repeated more
than a few times in the various analyses of the problem published during this
time period. The English law to which the Commissioners refer (cited above)
equates the human worker to a piece of machinery in order to justify the cost of
compensation being paid by the employer.  Another example is  found in the
theory of contractual liability, which was one of the three ways that an employee
could sue his employer in civil responsibility prior to the creation of the
workmen's compensation regime69.  It too aimed to protect the worker and
justified this protection by reifying him. The theory underlying a claim based in
contract was that the employment contract between the employer and the worker
imposed an implicit obligation on the employer to protect its employees from
accidents.  The scope of this obligation was exhaustive :   the employer's duty
was nothing less than one to guarantee the absolute safety of the worker.  J.
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Cléophas Lamothe, in describing the theory as it was developed by its Belgian
founder, Sainctelette, asserts :
D'après M. Sainctelette, la responsabilité du patron, résultant du
contrat de louage, consiste à garantir la parfaite sécurité  de son
ouvrier.  Il est tenu aux termes du contrat de le rendre à lui-même en
aussi bon état qu'il l'a reçu, comme le locataire  doit remettre  la
chose louée dans le même état qu'il l'a reçue, et comme l'entrepreneur
de transport qui doit livrer intacte la chose qu'on lui a confiée.70
If the employee was seen as more than merely a worker in the early
1900s, and if the worker's compensation regime was created out of any concern
at all for him as human being, it is not altogether clear that this humanitarian
concern completely represents a concern for his human dignity. The principal
research report leading to the creation of the law and the theory of contractual
liability used at that time suggest that dignity, understood as the respect of the
human being simply because he is a human being, may not have been
contemplated during the Act's creation.  It may merely have been the fact that
he kept industry running that the worker was protected.
Interestingly, the concern for the worker as a human being as seen in
both the Globensky report and the theory of contractual liability, whether or not
it embodied a right to internal dignity as we understand it today, seems to have
taken a secondary role once the Act was adopted.  Three months following the
Globensky report, Taschereau, in the debates of the National Assembly,
described the soon to be enacted Workman's Compensation Act in the following
manner :
La loi que nous nous proposons de présenter est calquée sur
les lois anglaise, française et belge, ne donnant pas tout ce que les
ouvriers demandent, mais accordant plus que ce que les patrons
voudraient donner….
Il espère qu'avec le temps on pourra aller plus loin et créer
l'assurance d'État pour les ouvriers.  En Allemagne cette assurance
donne des résultats merveilleux.
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Pour le moment la loi va surtout s'appliquer à éviter les
procès entre ouvriers et patrons et à régler les réclamations à
l'amiable.
À l'heure actuelle, le gouvernement ne peut pas forcer les
patrons à assurer leurs employés, mais l'on désire s'assurer que dans
les cas d'accidents graves ou fatals, il y ait une rémunération
suffisante pour la survie des femmes et enfants d'ouvriers71
The primary aim was therefore to solve disputes without animosity and to
provide financial support for the injured worker's family.
The first decade of judgments following the law's adoption developed
the aims and objectives of the law.  However, it was not altogether clear how the
rights of integrity and dignity fit into the regime. The object of the law was not
expansively set out in the 1909 Act.  Indeed, the only indication of the Act's
purpose was found in its title which stated that it was an «[a]ct respecting the
responsibility for accidents suffered by workmen in the course of their work, and
the compensation for injuries resulting therefrom».  Section 2 of the Act tells us
that a rent based on the worker's wages would be paid in cases of incapacity but
it is through judicial interpretation that this was established to mean that an
injured worker would receive compensation for injury resulting only if it
resulted in a diminished capacity to work.  For example, in Cater v. Grand
Trunk Railway72, decided two years after the law's adoption, it was stated as a
general principle that the compensation provided under section 2 of the Act was
only for those whose capacity to work was reduced as a result of the injury.  In
addition to showing reduced capacity, the worker had to demonstrate that his
incapacity to work would result in reduced revenue73.  Similarly, in Giguère v.
Frechette, decided the same year, the Superior Court held that the fact that the
plaintiff's hand had been mutilated to the point of being unrecognizable had
nothing to do with determining the appropriate compensation to be awarded74.
One last example deals with a young worker who lost the tips of his index and
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middle fingers while working on a defective machine.  He tried to claim special
damages because the injury had hindered his career as a flutist —he was an
amateur flutist in an orchestra. The Court held that «the only earnings of the
plaintiff that could … be taken into consideration in estimating the amount of
compensation due to him under the …Act are [sic] the actual remuneration …
from his employment… no account can be taken of what he may have earned in
his leisure time»75.  As Professor Lippel notes, this ruled out compensation for
loss to enjoyment of life as well76.     
Read together, these examples seem to suggest that it was not for the fact
that the worker suffered injury nor for the total amount of the injury he suffered
that he received compensation77.  Rather, compensation was received merely for
the reduction of his capacity to work.  Relating this to the notion of integrity, it
would appear that although the Act provided compensation for the loss of
wholeness that the worker suffered, it was only because this loss of integrity
represented revenue lost.  As illustrated by the case of the flutist, the loss of
integrity would only be compensated for the degree to which it caused a loss of
revenue. Moreover, only loss of physical integrity would be considered by the
courts.
It would thus seem that concern for the worker merely because he was
a human being was not the principal focus of attention once the regime was put
in place.  But other aspects of the worker's compensation regime tell us that this
perception is not entirely true.  Under the Act, the beneficiary was entitled to a
lifetime rent78.  The generosity of the legislation at the time, especially compared
to its most current version, demonstrates a concern for the worker that goes
beyond merely bringing him back to work.  Although the amount paid
represented only a portion of the injury suffered, the fact of offering a lifetime
rent shows concern that the worker have money to somehow ease the suffering
resulting from the accident and to maintain his family.  This concern becomes
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even more evident when we consider the fact that the worker did not have to
prove economic hardship in order to receive this compensation.   
In summary, the first decade following the Act's creation was a period
during which the Act's objectives were established by the Courts.  Although it
may not appear at first glance that the worker's integrity was being protected for
any reason other than to save him from losing revenue, if we keep in mind that
the indemnity was a lifetime rent and the fact that the employee did not have to
prove that he was under financial hardship in order to receive this indemnity, it
becomes clear that consideration of the worker as a human being must have
played some role in the legislature’s reasons for indemnifying the worker. 
Modifications between 1926 and 1985
This time period shows a clearer movement towards greater recognition
of the employee as a person whose dignity was respected as opposed to merely
a worker. Three major modifications that occurred during this time period are :
a) the Act allowed compensation for industrial diseases in addition to industrial
accidents79, b) the Act provided rehabilitation for an injured worker not only to
bring him back into the workforce but also to facilitate his return to normal life
and his reintegration into society80 and c) the law's field of application became
progressively wider, providing for more industries and workers81.
These modifications were made after the government received the
results of a commissioned inquiry into the functioning of the Act.  Repeating
history, the Quebec government once again took an active approach to inquiring
into the ways in which the current version of the Workmen's Compensation law
could be improved.  In 1923, it appointed five commissioners to look into the
working conditions in Quebec as they relate to the compensation regime and to
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specifically examine the how compensation is determined and how this
determination could be improved82.  This Commission, commonly known as the
«Roy Commission» was composed of the President, Ernest Roy, who
represented the government, two commissioners who represented the interests
of employers and two representing the interests of Quebec workers affected by
the regime.  The Commissioners set about their task by first sending
questionnaires to organizations of workers, employers and other interested
groups such as insurance companies83. Forty-nine hundred questionnaires were
sent out and a large number of them were answered by letters providing detailed
recommendations and/or a projet de loi. It then held public consultations in six
cities across the province.  
The Roy report is absolutely fascinating.  A significant number of the
written responses sent by the worker and employer organizations are reproduced
in full. We are thus able to examine the concerns of the workers and to see how
the law was adapted to accommodate them.   The principal humanitarian
concerns raised by the workers can be divided into three major themes that
demonstrate a desire to protect human dignity.  First, the workers sought to be
indemnified not only for workplace accidents but also for industrial diseases.
Second, most sought greater monetary compensation for the injured worker. The
amount of compensation given at the time was not enough to bring the worker
back to full health or to keep his family out of poverty.  Third, the workers
sought means of encouraging the employer to prevent the accidents that
occurred in the workplace. Interestingly, in the modifications to the Act that
took place between 1926 and 1931, provision was made for all of these
humanitarian concerns except for means of preventing accidents in the
workplace.  A lifetime rent was also extended to invalid widowers and widows
with certain exceptions84.  The compensation offered thus became more
concordant with the injury suffered. In summary, this second phase was an era
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during which the changes made to the Act, by their very nature, seem to indicate
greater respect for the human side of the worker.
1985 to present
During this phase, the Act generally moved from one that compensated
for injury suffered to one where the indemnity provided aimed primarily at
bringing the employee back to work.  Unlike all of its predecessors, the current
legislation awards no lifetime compensation.  Instead, the worker is merely
awarded the difference between what she earned before the accident and what
she would be earning if working at a job for which she is suited.  The worker
who returns to work loses all compensation, even if she continues to suffer from
after-effects of the injury85.  The progressive concern for the dignity of the
worker, established in the legislation over the years has thus taken a
considerable step backward.  As Katherine Lippel notes, the most recent version
of the AIAOD has strong characteristics of a social security Act as opposed to
one truly aimed at compensation86.  Inserting a dignity criterion for sexual
harassment cases may, to a certain degree, run counter to the current evolution
of the Act.  However, the lump sum amount awarded would not aim to fully
compensate the victim for the dignity lost.  Similar to the amounts currently
awarded for loss of integrity, the lump sum for dignity would also be symbolic.
Furthermore, providing a dignity award would establish a link between the
traditional aims of the regime (partial compensation for injury suffered) and the
new goals of the Act (maintenance of revenue).
In summary, many of the major reforms since 1926 suggest a move
toward greater recognition of the moral rights and dignity of the worker. In light
of this trend, I think that Act could support a modification allowing partial lump
sum compensation for the affront to dignity caused by sexual harassment.
  
As an additional note, looking outside of the Act to the Civil law of
Quebec more generally, a definite movement involving placing the person and
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personality rights at the centre of the law has taken place.  This legal shift in
emphasis has occurred over the past three decades. It is most predominately
evidenced by the adoption of the Quebec Charter in 1975 and the reform of the
Civil Code of Quebec. In 1994, the Code became one where the Book of Persons
became much more detailed and which announces in its preliminary disposition
the primacy of the Quebec Charter87.  This new ideology promoting respect for
the person has manifested itself in smaller ways as well.  We have witnessed the
proliferation of laws created to protect those with less than full legal capacity
including the Mental Patients Protection Act88, and the Youth Protection Act89.
Similarly, the year 1971 saw the codification of respect of the person's
inviolability90.  Reforming the AIAOD so that it respects the dignity of the
individual can not only be supported by the Act’s historical evolution, it is also
change that is much in keeping with the modern ideology of the Quebec Civil
law.
IV- Conclusions
The jurisprudence is now clear that a worker cannot claim for moral
damages under the Charter further to an incident sexual harassment if the same
incident has given rise to an employment injury that has been indemnified under
the AIAOD.  In light of this fact, and given that there are definite advantages to
making a claim under the AIAOD, it becomes necessary to examine possible
ways of providing victims who choose to claim under the AIAOD with
compensation that acknowledges the moral injury suffered. One such way is to
introduce changes to the Act that recognize the affront to dignity that sexual
harassment poses.    
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91. Once the appeal in Genest has been decided and the additional situations in which a victim
of sexual harassment will be precluded from Charter damages have been established, it will
be easier to determine the stage at which and to whom this advice should be given.
As a first step, the CSST should be obliged to tell all workers who are
victims of sexual harassment at the workplace of their option to take action
under the droit commun through the QHRC or in the regular court system and
the advantages of doing so.  The CSST should give this advice before the claim
for sexual harassment is accepted so that the worker is aware that bringing a
claim to the CSST precludes her from receiving full compensation, including
compensation for moral injury under the Charter later on91.
If the worker then chooses to pursue her claim at the CSST (which she
may do, given that she will likely receive compensation sooner and time away
from the troubling work environment), a monetary award should be given for the
affront to dignity that the incident of sexual harassment has caused her.  In
keeping with the aim of the worker's compensation regime to provide a type of
insurance instead of full compensation for the injury suffered, this lump sum
would represent less than the full amount of the injury suffered. It could be given
in successful claims under section 83. Moreover, in cases where loss of or
interference with integrity cannot be successfully demonstrated under section 83
but sexual harassment has clearly occurred, dignity could be used as the basis
for awarding the proposed lump sum or other types of compensation like time
away from work. Currently, the AIAOD provides compensation only for the loss
of integrity that the worker suffers as a result of sexual harassment.  For sexual
harassment victims, this loss of integrity usually manifests itself in the form of
stress or a stress-related injury like depression. As the causal link between the
harassment and the injury must be strong for the worker to successfully bring a
claim, workers who have suffered other stressful events in their lives may find
it difficult to recover. The extensive and intrusive examinations of the
Commission have led to workers being refused compensation because of its
determination that the injury was caused by other events in the worker's life, not
the harassment. Providing a fixed, indexed amount for dignity will ensure that
victims of sexual harassment are not being precluded from all recovery,
especially those victims with traumatic personal histories.  The question of
whether to award the lump sum will turn on the factual question of whether
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sexual harassment did indeed occur. Furthermore, an award for dignity addresses
the fact that it is an affront to dignity, not integrity, that is the first and foremost
result of any incident of sexual harassment.      
A review of the history of the AIAOD, specifically, the degree to which
dignity was contemplated during its creation and the growing place it has come
to occupy throughout the Act's legislative growth over seventy-five years,
suggests that the Act can support this modification.  Such a modification is also
very much in keeping with the development of Quebec Civil law which, over the
past three decades, has increasingly placed central emphasis on the person and
personality rights.  However, given that the Act has become one of social
security which primarily aims to maintain the worker’s revenue, inserting a
symbolic lump sum for loss of or interference with dignity would alter the
course of the Act’s evolution.
Nevertheless, in light of the practical advantages that encourage victims
to seek compensation at the CSST, such as time away from the harasser and the
possibility that the situation will remedy itself so that the stigma and difficulties
related to suing can be avoided, I think the factors that may push a worker to
choose to make a claim under the CSST should be respected. As well, since
sexual harassment is a unique industrial accident in that it affects primarily the
dignity of the worker instead of her integrity and given the bar to recovering
moral damages under the Charter, the Act should acknowledge and compensate
the affront to dignity suffered.  
Overall, introducing compensation for the affront to dignity that sexual
harassment causes into the AIAOD is an option that would be advantageous to
workers, both from a philosophical and practical standpoint.  It is also a
modification that could be made to fit into the current and constant evolutions
of the Act and the Quebec Civil law.
